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Judicial review of scientific findings
Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere, the University of Otago
considers the judicial review of NIWA’s publication of data
T
he High Court decision in New Zealand Climate
Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water
and Atmospheric Research [2012] NZHC 2297 is a
rare example of judicial examination of scientific research
undertaken by publicly-owned bodies, but also represents a
potentially worrying precedent.
The plaintiff, the New Zealand Climate Science Educa-
tion Trust, is closely associated with the New Zealand Cli-
mate Science Coalition, a group interested in both science
behind — and the politics surrounding — the issue of climate
change. Both the Trust and the Coalition took issue with
findings published by the National Institute of Water and
Atmospheric Research. The Coalition publicly criticised the
validity of those findings, and the Trust sought to challenge
the findings by way of judicial review.
At issuewasthereleasebyNIWAoffindingsonNewZealand’s
temperature record, and three of its decisions in particular:
• the release of the ‘Seven Station Temperature Series’
(the ‘7SS’) detailing surface temperature trends derived
from data collected at seven weather stations around
the country from 1909 to 2009;
• the release of the ‘Eleven Station Temperature Series’
(the ‘11SS’): a set of unadjusted data from a range of
weather stations; and
• a review of the data that made up the 7SS (the ‘review’).
Each of the 7SS, the 11SS and the review all indicated that
New Zealand’s temperature record experienced a warming
trend in the past century. That trend has the potential to give
evidential basis for policy decisions upon climate change in
New Zealand. The Trust argued for various reasons that the
data underlying NIWA’s findings — and thus any conclusions
drawn from the data — were invalid. Since NIWA is a
statutory body, such flaws warranted the Court’s examina-
tion and intervention.
Specifically, the Trust argued that in breach of its statutory
duty, NIWA ignored recognised scientific opinion when com-
piling the 7SS, selectively used the 11SS data to justify the
7SS, and then repeated the same errors in the review. These
alleged errors led to the Trust arguing that each of the
decisions were invalid. NIWA responded to the allegations
first by arguing that they were not amenable to review and
second, that they were unfounded.
THE DECISION
Although the Trust was successful in arguing that NIWA’s
decisions were potentially amenable to review, the Court did
not accept its arguments that the decisions were invalid.
Whilst the focus of this paper is on Venning J’s ruling on
amenability, the reasons why he rejected the substantive
claims of the Trust are easily stated.
First, Venning J held that NIWA’s statutory duty under
s 5(1)(b) of the Crown Research Institutes Act 1992 to
“pursue excellence in all its activities” was aspirational but
nevertheless “important and enforceable”(at [77]). How-
ever, the breach of such a duty “would need to be clear” and
in these circumstances, the Trust’s evidence did not prove
that NIWA did not apply recognised scientific opinion when
compiling the 7SS. The Trust’s arguments that NIWA had
committed a mistake of fact and had acted unreasonably
regarding the conclusions it came to based on the 7SS data
were also rejected. Venning J held instead that “such mistake
that there is on this issue has, in my view, been made by the
Trust and its deponents” (at [114)]).
Second, the Court held that the decision by NIWA to
release the 11SS data — in response to criticism by the
Coalition of the 7SS findings — was valid. There simply was
not enough evidence before the Court to substantiate the
Trust’s criticism that the data was selective and did not
adequately corroborate the 7SS findings, and the Judge pre-
ferred NIWA’s evidence to the contrary (at [137]).
Finally, the Court rejected the argument by the Trust that
the review was invalid. This criticism by the Trust focused
upon the methodology used by NIWA to review the 7SS,
which the Trust argued was not reasonably open to it. The
Court accepted the evidence of NIWA that its approach to
the review was not a departure from recognised scientific
opinion.
At several points in his judgment, Venning J highlighted the
limits of the Court’s ability to resolve the substantive disagree-
ments between NIWA and the Trust. The disagreements were
based on conflicting evidence, indicating “a scientific debate
which this Court is not in a position to determine one way or
the other” (at [173]). Venning J deftly sidestepped this issue,
holding that the Court did not need to resolve that debate, but
instead simply needed to determine whether the approach
taken by NIWA was “tenable”. Yet that approach assumes
that there is not one true “best-practice” scientific methodol-
ogy—thattherearearangeofapproachesaboutwhichreason-
able scientists could disagree — and thus in taking such an
approach,VenningJneverthelessdeterminedan issueof scien-
tific debate. This highlights the almost unavoidable danger
that the Court puts itself in when choosing to embark on
judicial review of such specialised decision-making, and thus
why Venning J’s decision that the decisions of NIWA were
amenable to review isworthyof critique.
PUBLICLY-OWNEDBODIES
In making his determination on whether NIWA and its
processes were amenable to judicial review, Venning J recited
orthodox principles. NIWA is a Crown Research Institute
and therefore a “Crown Entity Company”, defined as a
registered company wholly owned by the Crown per the
Crown Entities Act 2004, s 7(1)(b) and Sch 2. As Venning J
summarised, NIWA is a public body, it carries out research
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functions for the benefit of the country (at [27]). However,
another attribute of NIWA that Venning J did not emphasise
in his summary is that it operates at arm’s length from
government. Ministers are shareholders, but its decision-
making and corporate governance is controlled by indepen-
dent directors.
Of course, publicly-owned organisations that operate at
arm’s length from government are not immune from judicial
review, as established by Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity
Corporation of New Zealand [1994] 2 NZLR 385. In that
decision, the Privy Council declined to intervene in the con-
tracting decision of a State Owned Enterprise (SOE). The test
for whether intervention was appropriate in the commercial
decision-making of an SOE was when it was tainted by fraud,
corruption or bad faith (at 391).
Mercury Energy received close examination by the Court
of Appeal in Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District
Health Board [2009] 1 NZLR 776, which opted for a more
contextual approach to the amenability of publicly-owned
bodies to judicial review ([56]–[60]). This result was described
by Hammond J, in a separate but concurring judgment, as
accepting the test in Mercury Energy as not exhaustive but
subject to incremental change (at [404]). Importantly, the
Court of Appeal rejected expanding the test to include “any
other material departure from accepted public sector ethical
standards which requires judicial intervention” a test described
by counsel for the unsuccessful second respondent as requir-
ing “good hygiene in public decision-making” (at [343]). The
Court rejected that test because it “overstates the courts’ role
in this context” and potentially gives rise to “indeterminate
scope for intervention by the courts” (at [343]–[344]). In that
case, a contracting decision by a district health board about
the provision of community laboratory services was a dis-
pute “not well suited to being dealt with in judicial review
proceedings” with “factual and other subtleties […] too
great to be dealt with in what is supposed to be “a relatively
simple, untechnical and prompt procedure”” (at [342]).
Turning to the NIWA decision, Lab Tests and the con-
cerns of the Court of Appeal did not factor in Venning J’s
decision about the theoretical amenability of NIWA and its
decisions to judicial review. Instead, his Honour focused on
Mercury Energy, establishing two critical differences between
the facts of that case and the proceedings before him. First,
CRIs such as NIWA have a primary purpose that is public
rather than commercial (at [33]). Second, whilst there are
remedies available in private law for those affected by com-
mercial decisions of SOEs, no counterpart remedies exist
with regards to CRIs: judicial review is the only recourse:
“[a]lthough private individuals and corporate bodies could
be affected by NIWA’s decisions, in the absence of judicial
review, such parties could be left without redress” (at [34]).
Venning J instead invoked Lab Tests when considering the
appropriate “intensity” of review; a peculiarity since the
word “intensity” does not feature in Lab Tests. The Court
should be “cautious” about intervening in decisions made by
specialist bodies and reluctant to adjudicate on matters of
scientific debate (at [45]–[47]). Accordingly, while NIWA’s
decisions were theoretically amenable to review, only a low-
intensity review was appropriate. Unless its decisions were so
“clearly wrong in principle and law”, the Court would not
intervene (at [48]).
PROBLEMS WITH THE APPROACH
It is questionable whether the level of intensity chosen by
VenningJwasofanyrealconsequence.“Clearlywrong”means
“a decision outside the permissible boundaries to the exercise
ofa [decision-maker’s]discretion” (TeWinivR [2011]NZCA
617 at [16]). Such a standard is no more exacting a standard
than normal. Thus, any moderating influence provided by
setting the standard of review to “low intensity” was redun-
dant, and raises the question as to whether a better valve was
the inquiry of whether the decisions were amenable to review
atall.
Venning J’s decision on amenability of review appeared to
be driven by the maxim “that every wrong should have a
remedy”, a worthy watchword given that “[n]o defect in the
constitution of a state deserves greater reproach than the giv-
ing licence to do wrong without affording redress”. (Dawn
Oliver, “Public law procedures and remedies — do we need
them?”[2002]PL91,104).However, it isdifficult to locate the
precise “wrong” here. NIWA argued that the Trust overstated
the extent to which NIWA’s activities have direct public conse-
quences (at [40]), yet this is an understatement: it is difficult to
see how the compilation, release and review of scientific data
have any direct public consequences. As acknowledged by the
Court, the data could be used in the formulation of climate
change policy by government. However, until that policy is
formulated the data has no innate value or consequences;
neithertheTrustnoranyotherpersonisdirectlyaffectedbythe
data.
If government made decisions that affected the Trust based
on the data then there is nothing stopping the Trust arguing
that the decisions are invalid due to the poor quality of the
data. This argument, after all, was accepted by Cooke P when
he attempted to establish mistake of fact as a ground of review
in Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130
(CA): an immigration decision was invalid because it was
basedona factually incorrect expert report.Atnopoint in that
case was it ever suggested that the expert was amenable to
review,andnorshouldNIWA’sdecisionsbeamenabletoreview.
Without more, NIWA’s decisions, lacking the potential to
directly affect others, are not properly classified as “wrongs”;
theTrustwasnotproperlyoweda remedy.
The entry point for Venning J was the statutory context
surrounding NIWA and the connection it has to government.
In that sense, all decisions by NIWA and other Crown Entities
haveapubliccharacter.This,however, isnot thewatchword in
judicial review: it is thenatureof theparticulardecision—and
not thedecision-maker—that is the focusof the inquiry, and if
the decision involves determinations on scientific debate, they
shouldnotbeamenable to review.
NIWA has had its fair share of litigation recently, specifi-
cally itsdecisiontodismissDrJimSalinger (whoseworkwasat
the core of the present proceedings). That litigation, however,
took place in the Employment Relations Authority. Where
NIWA makes decisions leading to commercial or employment
wrongs, there are remedies in the private law. When NIWA
makes public decisions that have actual adverse effects, then
those wronged should have a remedy in judicial review. This is
not what happened here, however, and to mischaracterise all
NIWA’s decisions as theoretically being amenable to judicial
review is to set a dangerous precedent, potential leading to
inappropriate interference with independent Crown entities
and to the High Court being faced with issues of scientific
debate that it hasnoability to resolve. r
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